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Legal Education: A Perspective on the Last 130 Years 
of American Legal Training 
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.* 
It is customary on an occasion such as this for one to acknowledge 
that he is deeply honored by this appointment. Elevation to a 
distinguished professorship at one of the world’s leading research 
universities is the pinnacle of recognition for an academic. All of that 
is true in my case. This is yet another high honor graciously bestowed 
upon me by this great institution for which I am humbly grateful. 
However, such sentiments, valid as they are, fall far short of 
expressing what I feel about this appointment.  
When Joel Seligman came to my faculty office to tell me that he 
had recommended, and that Chancellor Wrighton had approved, my 
appointment to this chair, I was overwhelmed. It was not just the 
appointment to a distinguished professorship, as much as that means 
to me; it was the appointment to this specific chair, the William R. 
Orthwein Distinguished Professorship, that moved me. This is the 
chair that Bill Orthwein, a man whom I have grown to respect and 
admire, generously endowed in memory of his father, a graduate of 
this law school. 
I first met Bill shortly after I arrived here in 1987. Not long 
before, he endowed the predecessor to this chair to help the school 
achieve its goal of further strengthening the faculty by making a 
major senior appointment. In our first discussion he enthusiastically 
embraced our determination not to settle for less than the very best 
person. He understood that success would not come easily or quickly. 
His only desire was to help better this school. Throughout the lengthy 
recruiting process, Bill was patient and encouraging. Thanks to his 
generosity we were able to have a series of truly distinguished 
visitors and to recruit Lynn LoPucki as the first permanent Orthwein 
 
  * William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law. This Article is a slightly revised 
version of an address delivered by the author on November 3, 1999, on the occasion of his 
installation as the William R. Orthwein Distinguised Professor of Law. 
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professor. All those whom we attracted because of Bill’s generosity 
contributed to the law school’s rise in stature. 
 There is no need for me to remind you of Bill’s unique influence 
on the success of McDonnell-Douglas and of his contributions to the 
betterment of Washington University and other St. Louis institutions. 
I want to highlight the generous gifts Bill and his wife Laura have 
made to support the work of two other St. Louis institutions with 
which my wife Sondra and I have ties. As many of you know, Sondra 
regularly volunteers at the Missouri Botanical Garden and is an avid 
supporter of that wonderful institution. Thanks to Bill and Laura, the 
Missouri Botanical Garden is the location of the Orthwein Floral 
Display Hall and now the Orthwein Entry Hall at the garden’s new 
Monsanto Research Center. And a little over a month ago, we joined 
many others in celebrating the dedication of the Orthwein Plaza at the 
Missouri Historical Society, on whose Board of Trustees I am 
privileged to serve. So, you see why this chair has special meaning to 
me. 
Holding the chair named for William R. Orthwein, Sr., Bill’s 
father, adds to the luster of this honor. Born in St. Louis in 1881, son 
of a German immigrant and Civil War veteran who built up a very 
successful grain business in St. Louis, William R. Orthwein, Sr., was 
destined to make his mark in law, business, public service and 
politics. He graduated from this School of Law in 1905. Like his 
forty-nine classmates, he completed the course of study for the LL.B. 
degree in only two years. He was one of the minority among his class 
who had acquired a B.A. before entering law school, in his case, from 
Yale.  
Throughout his professional life he was active in Republican 
politics in St. Louis. A powerful orator who effectively utilized the 
new medium of radio as early as 1929, he tenaciously pressed for 
clean government and elections. He served as a campaign manager 
for gubernatorial candidates and candidates for mayor. Mr. Orthwein 
was largely responsible for the election of William D. Becker as 
mayor of St. Louis in 1941. He was appointed supply commissioner 
of the city, responsible for the purchase and management of the 
supplies for all city offices and institutions. He held that fiduciary 
post with honor during the stressful years of World War II when 
scarcity and rationing compounded the burdens and pressures on his 
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office. Simultaneously, he served as property custodian for the Office 
of Civil Defense. In 1950, at the age of sixty-seven, he scored a big 
upset in the local elections by winning the Republican nomination for 
collector of revenue for the City of St. Louis, defeating the candidates 
supported by a well-oiled party machine. In the election that fall, he 
was the party’s chief hope, but the coattails of the Democratic 
candidate for senator, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., were too long and 
Mr. Orthwein lost the election. In his only bid for statewide office, he 
was the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor. 
Mr. Orthwein was a leader of the bar. An active member of the St. 
Louis, Missouri and American Bar Associations and of the St. Louis 
Lawyers Association, he was unanimously elected president of the 
Lawyers Association in 1939. He chaired the judicial committee of 
the Lawyers Association that was charged to scrutinize and evaluate 
the judicial system. Mr. Orthwein was a founder and the first 
secretary of the Legal Aid Society of St. Louis, which ultimately 
became Legal Services of Eastern Missouri. 
He was a leader in many other civic activities. He was a member 
of the Board of Deacons at the Second Presbyterian Church for forty 
years and a director of the church corporation. He was vice-president 
and legal advisor of the St. Louis Grand Opera Guild. He was a 
founder of the Missouri Athletic Club. In addition, he was active in 
Washington University alumni affairs, serving as president of the 
Law School Alumni Association. 
Lawyer, businessman, politician, civic leader, and man of 
integrity, William R. Orthwein held a posit ion of outstanding 
influence in business, politics, and the legal profession for more than 
half a century. I am proud to hold the professorship named in his 
honor and memory. 
As I thought about the subject of this afternoon’s talk, I pondered 
the significance of the high honor of this distinguished chair. It is 
hardly a secret that what scholarly accomplishments I may claim 
were achieved more than a decade ago. For eleven years, my 
intellectual energy was devoted not to the law of products liability or 
antitrust, or any other subject in which I once claimed a modest level 
of expertise, but rather on the subject of legal education itself. Hence 
I must infer that those who decided to appoint me to this chair did so 
in light of my work in legal education and not my scholarship alone. I 
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hasten to add that I accept the chair as a challenge to publish 
significant scholarship in the future. 
With that in mind, I decided to use the occasion to talk with you 
about the subject of legal education. I begin with some observations 
about the past and conclude with some brief thoughts for the future. 
After I was appointed dean in 1987, I was invited to be an 
honorary initiate of the local chapter of Phi Delta Phi, a legal 
fraternity. The impressive induction ceremony was held in a federal 
courtroom. Before administering the oath, the senior members, 
arrayed across the bench in judicial robes, catechized each of the 
student initiates. The questions related to the principles and history of 
the fraternity. Fortunately, they excused the honorary initiate from 
displaying such erudition. But I was struck by a student initiate’s 
correct answer to the question: “Who was the first honorary initiate 
of this chapter?” It was William Gardiner Hammond. 
At the end of the ceremony, I inquired if the new honorary initiate 
might address a question to the bench. I detected some misgivings but 
the benchers courteously acquiesced. I asked them, “Who was 
William Gardiner Hammond?” I was not surprised, but I think the 
newly sworn in members were amused, to learn that not one erstwhile 
inquisitor, including the faculty adviser, could answer the question. 
Sic transit gloria decanorum. Former deans are soon forgotten. A 
current radio commercial plays on the theme that if you want to be 
remembered, you better be first. Being the second won’t do.  
Many are familiar with founding dean Henry Hitchcock’s singular 
devotion, perseverance, and his self-sacrifice in establishing and 
nurturing this institution in its infancy. There is much in the school’s 
institutional memory to remind us of this active practicing lawyer’s 
critical role in launching and setting the initial course of the St. Louis 
Law School, as the law department of Washington University was 
then known.  
Few now recall his successor, William Gardiner Hammond, this 
school’s first full-time professor and dean, who was appointed in 
1881. Hammond was the second dean and so has been largely 
forgotten. However, he deserves to be remembered. His contributions 
to this law school, the legal profession, and the development of what 
is now universally regarded as the American model of university 
legal education should be recalled and honored. 
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Hammond was a highly regarded scholar, legal educator, and 
remarkably successful dean at another law school. When Hammond 
accepted Washington University’s offer, other schools were 
vigorously recruiting him. The appointment drew heightened 
attention to the school. 
I want to tell you a little about this remarkable legal educator and 
his accomplishments. I think then you will understand why I view 
what he and this school achieved as good omens for the future. As the 
historian Thomas Barnes observed, Hammond was among the “first 
generation of academic teachers-scholars in the law who were the 
creators of the modern American law school.”1 Others have 
characterized him as “a man of broad vision whose chief interest lay 
in legal education,”2 “an eminent person” in his time,3 “a magnetic 
teacher who manifested a keen interest in his students,” 4 the “most 
eminent authority in America on the history of the common law,”5 
“one of the top ten law teachers in . . . America, ranking with 
Langdell and Ames (Harvard), Theodore Timothy Dwight 
(Columbia), . . . Thomas McIntyre Cooley (Michigan), Theodore 
Salisbury Woolsey (Yale), and two or three others of like stature.”6 
Hammond was born in Rhode Island in 1829. 7 Under his lawyer-
father’s tutelage, the young Hammond read widely and became fluent 
in Latin, Greek, French, and German, and could read other European 
languages as well. He graduated first in his class from Amherst 
College in 1849. 
Preparation for the bar in a Brooklyn lawyer’s office was an 
intellectual let down for the bookish Hammond and markedly 
influenced his later life. Twenty years later, as he began working out 
 
 1. THOMAS GARDEN BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY 
90 (1978). 
 2. THE SEVENTY -FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY SAINT LOUIS 1867-1942, 10 (1942). 
 3. Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the Lieber Revival, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2135, 2140 (1994). 
 4. Id. at 2142. 
 5. Emlin McClain, William Gardiner Hammond, in 8 Great American Lawyers 191, 230 
(William D. Lewis ed., 1909). See 4 BENJAMIN F. GUE, HISTORY OF IOWA 117 (1903). 
 6. BARNES, supra  note 1, at 89.  
 7. The facts of Hammond’s life are taken from Emlin McClain, William Gardiner 
Hammond, in 8 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 191, 230 (William D. Lewis ed., 1909); GUE, 
supra  note 5, at 117-18. 
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a plan for systematic legal education, he would remark, “of the many 
injuries for which I may thank [my mentor] not the least is that he 
never in a single instance sent me to a case or volume of reports to 
look for law.”8 Hammond was admitted to the bar in 1851 and 
practiced law in Brooklyn until 1856 where he developed a low 
regard for the learning and ability of his fellow lawyers. He then 
sailed to Europe to study civil law and legal history at Heidelberg. 
The financial crash of 1857 forced him to return after two years and 
resume his practice in Manhattan, where he found his colleagues at 
the bar no more competent than those in Brooklyn.  
In 1860, he traveled to Iowa at the request of his brother, a 
railroad civil engineer. He took employment as a chainman for one 
dollar a day on a construction project in Anamosa, Iowa. He raised a 
company of militia for the Union army, although apparently the 
closest they came to the fighting was drilling in the village square. In 
1863 he opened a law practice in Anamosa and three years later 
moved to Des Moines, Iowa. He was designated as the official 
Reporter to the Supreme Court of Iowa and commenced work on a 
digest of the court’s decisions, which became his first legal 
publication. 9 He had his first opportunity to teach law at the law 
school established by two members of the Iowa Supreme Court. In 
1867, he became the editor of a new journal, The Western Jurist, 
which was the only legal periodical published west of the Allegheny 
mountains.  
In 1868, the Regents of the State University invited Hammond 
and the school to move to the University at Iowa City, where he was 
appointed chancellor of the law department, a position he held until 
he became dean of the St. Louis Law School at Washington 
University in 1881. 10 
Hammond was appointed in 1870 to a commission to revise and 
codify Iowa's statutes. He was responsible for the substantive law 
 
 8. William G. Hammond, Plan of a Textbook of Law (1869) (unpublished manuscript), 
reprinted in 17 IOWA L. REV. 490 (1932). 
 9. WILLIAM G. HAMMOND, DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IOWA FROM THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1859 TO THE JUNE TERM, 1866 (1866). 
 10. Emlin McClain, Law Department of the Sta te University of Iowa, 1 GREEN BAG 374 
(1889); Helen S. Moylan, A Manuscript Record of the Early Days of the Iowa Law School, 22 
IOWA L. REV. 108 (1936). 
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sections and the overall organization of the Iowa Code of 1873.11 His 
structure withstood repeated recodifications.12  
He proposed to write a treatise on the history of the common law: 
“with secret hope of leaving something by which I could be 
remembered after I am gone."13 He taught himself Anglo-Saxon and 
carefully read the English Year Books, making voluminous notes and 
even translating some cases. Unfortunately, that work was never 
completed, although it did provide the basis for lectures later 
delivered at Boston and Ann Arbor. However, in 1876, he published 
an American edition of the Institutes of Justinian.14 His scholarly 
“Introduction” to that work, subsequently published separately, took 
issue with the then prevalent idea that the civil law reflected a 
scientific system of classification whereas the common law was 
completely unsystematic.15 
Hammond followed four years later with the publication of a new 
edition of Francis Leiber’s Hermeneutics,16 in its day one of the most 
esteemed treatments of the theory of interpretation. Perhaps 
Hammond’s crowning scholarly achievement was the edition of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries he published after coming to St. Louis.17 
For this “variorum” edition, Hammond examined all of the English 
and American editions, as well as 2500 American cases. His lengthy 
and erudite “Introduction” is a defense of Blackstone against the 
attacks of John Austin and the English analytic school of legal 
thought.18 
 
 11. McClain, supra  note 5, at 224-25. 
 12. Id. at 225. 
 13. Id. at 230. 
 14. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (Thomas C. Sandars trans., William G. Hammond ed., 
1876). 
 15. HAMMOND, SYSTEM OF LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF HALE AND BLACKSTONE IN ITS 
RELATION TO THE CIVIL LAW (1876). 
 16. FRANCIS LEIBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS, W ITH REMARKS ON PRECEDENTS 
AND AUTHORITIES (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880) (1837), reprinted in  16 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1883 (1995). 
 17. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (William G. 
Hammond ed., 1890) (8th ed. 1778) (the 8th edition was the last to receive the author’s 
additions and corrections). 
 18. Hammond’s defense was in turn criticized by John Chipman Gray in his famous 
lectures at Columbia in 1909. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 
222-33 (Roland Grey ed., 2d ed. 1921). 
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Except for his contributions to periodicals, the foregoing 
comprises the entire corpus of Hammond’s published work. His 
aspiration to leave “something by which [he] could be remembered 
after [he was] gone” was not realized. But his published scholarship 
does not begin to measure his original contributions to legal 
education. His failure to complete his magnum opus is justified, if not 
explained by, his tireless efforts devoted to creating the university 
law school as we now know it. 
When he began teaching law in 1866, Hammond had not himself 
experienced a law school education and had no opportunity to 
observe other law schools as models. However, probably no one then 
working in the field was more knowledgeable than Hammond, not 
just of the law schools that were in operation in post-civil war 
America, but of the law schools that enjoyed a brief existence in the 
post-revolutionary period, the English Inns of Court, and the 
medieval law schools of Europe. Hammond also had personal 
experience with the prevailing law office training.  
As Hammond reflected on how best to teach law, he quickly 
rejected the approaches then followed as totally inadequate for 
educating lawyers. The mode of teaching adopted in the existing law 
schools, including Washington University prior to his arrival here, 
was a combination of set lectures and recitations by students of 
passages memorized from assigned texts. Hammond rejected the 
“mere learning by rote of the pages of a law book in which were 
recited the deductions of the author from cases which the student had 
no means, or took no pains, to investigate.”19 “It is a common error,” 
he observed, “to think of legal education as consisting entirely in a 
set of rules which are to be learned . . ..”20 He expressed his view of 
legal education in terms that have a distinctly modern ring: 
The law school is a place where the student may learn to 
 
 19. McClain, supra note 5, at 220. Moreover, the texts themselves were inadequate in 
Hammond’s view because they were written for the practitioner, not for the student. “All of 
them,” he wrote, “have been written to serve a purpose entirely different from [the student’s], 
and inconsistent with it, and they presuppose in their reader the very knowledge which he is set 
to learn from their pages. William Gardiner Hammond, Legal Education and the Present State 
of th e Literature of the Law,  1 CENTRAL L.J. 292 (1874). 
 20. Hammond, supra note 19, at 293. 
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analyze a complicated statement of facts, and distinguish those 
that have legal significance from those that have not—to 
discriminate author ities and tell why one has more weight than 
another; to put a client’s demand or defense in such shape that 
he may be sure of having the benefit of all the law that is really 
on his side.21  
In the final analysis, Hammond viewed the law school as “ the place 
[for the student] to learn how to learn law during all the remainder of 
his professional life.”22 
Hammond’s first recorded thoughts on legal education are found 
in his journal for 1869, entitled Plan for a Textbook.23 There, he 
wrote:  
One purpose of the work should be to lead the student to read 
cases as much as possible in the place of text-books, and to fix 
these in his mind as the basis of all his study . . .. [T]he habit of 
looking at the actual decisions instead of the principle deduced 
seems to me the best possible way of guarding against the 
danger of making the faithful student a mere book-lawyer. I 
have no fear of his becoming a case-lawyer thereby, as 
distinguished from one who reasons out his conclusions by 
principle. On the contrary I am sure that the practice of taking 
the cases just as they stand, and deducing the principle from 
them for one’s self, is the best possible safeguard against such 
an intellectual fault.24  
This remarkable passage was written a year before Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, universally regarded as the father of the “case-
method,” was appointed dean at Harvard,25and two years before 
publication of Langdell’s seminal Cases on Contracts,26 in which he 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Hammond, supra note 8, at 490. 
 24. Id. at 493-94. 
 25. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 32 
(1978). 
 26. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL,  A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS: WITH REFERENCES AND CITATIONS (1871). 










166 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 6:157 
 
 
set forth his influential theory of legal education. 27 
Although Hammond appears to have anticipated Langdell, it was 
the latter whose method was emulated by legal educators throughout 
the land. Moreover, the similarities between Hammond’s and 
Langdell’s approaches to teaching the law, the principal one being 
the emphasis on cases rather than texts, were probably less significant 
than the differences. Unlike Langdell, Hammond never published the 
book he described in his journal. Hammond did use cases in his 
teaching, believing that “as a means of learning the law, [texts] are 
not to be compared with a judicious selection and arrangement of the 
cases from which they are made up. But the cases can be so used only 
under the guidance of an instructor, and with access to an ample 
library.”28 The Iowa Law School catalogue for 1869-70 declared: 
“Upon all the topics a large collection of reported cases are included 
in each day’s work, and the students are expected to be examined on 
these as well as on the treatises.”29 Rather than lecturing formally and 
assigning textbooks, Hammond “prepared in his principal subjects 
. . . printed synopses showing an analytical classification of the 
subject matter and giving references to leading cases to be read . . .. 
[H]e made familiar to his students by precept and example the 
methods by which the lawyer and the judge actually find out what the 
case law is and become skilful [sic] in applying the law of a case to 
its facts.”30 I have found no evidence that the class discussion or 
recitation was conducted in a Socratic mode. 
Langdell viewed law as a science and the law library as the 
laboratory, with the cases providing the basis for learning those 
“principles or doctrines’ of which “law, considered as a science, 
consists.”31 Langdell “[e]mphasized . . . a national common law, 
which theoretically controlled the courts of every state.”32 Hammond, 
like Langdell, also wrote of law as a science and spoke of the 
 
 27. Id. at v-vii. 
 28. Hammond, supra note 19, at 293. 
 29. Millard W. Hansen, The Early History of the College of Law, State University of 
Iowa: 1865-1884, 30 IOWA L. REV. 31, 46 (1944). 
 30. McClain, supra  note 5, at 220-21. 
 31. LANGDELL, supra note 26. 
 32. SELIGMAN , supra note 25, at 36. 
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importance of learning the principles and the theory of law.33 But, 
perhaps because his vantage point for scrutinizing American law was 
the west bank of the Mississippi rather than the banks of the Charles, 
he displayed a far more sophisticated understanding of the 
complexity and contradictions manifest in nineteenth century 
common law. He was conscious of the implications of “nearly forty 
different courts of last resort, each independent of all the rest . . . 
making decisions that may be quoted to each other.”34 He well 
understood the extent to which this system freed the judiciary from 
the constraints of precedent as venerated in England’s unitary legal 
system. 
“It is useless,” he opined, “ for judges to quote a score of cases 
from the digest to sustain almost every sentence, when every one 
knows that another score might be collected to support the opposite 
ruling.”35 Hammond explained that “the most honest judge knows 
that the authorities with which his opinions are garnished often have 
had very little to do with the decision of the case; perhaps have only 
been looked up after that decision was reached, upon the general 
equities of the case.”36 In words that foreshadowed the insights of 
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and the Realists of the 1930s, 
Hammond perceived how problematic this multiplicity of 
jurisdictions made consistent application of any supposed theory or 
principles of law: “It is the power of stating the facts as [the judge] 
himself views them, which preserves the superficial consistency and 
certainty of the law, and hides from careless eyes its utter lack of 
definiteness and precision.”37 Thus a judge, “[a]nxious to do justice, 
and free from the restrain[t]s which settled rules would impose . . . 
follows his sense of equity in giving the case to plaintiff or defendant, 
and then sets himself to the task, demanded by custom, of showing 
that such a decision is consistent with certain arbitrarily selected 
 
 33. Hammond was not always consistent. In some of his writings, especially his 
annotations to Leiber’s Hermeneutics and his introduction to Blackstone’s Commentaries, he 
appeared to subscribe to a theory of law that  approaches Langdell’s. 
 34. Hammond, supra note 19, at 293. 
 35. William G. Hammond, American Law Schools in the Past and in the Future, Address 
Before Law Department of the State University of Iowa 6 (June 20, 1881). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 7. 














Hammond’s astute comprehension of the law as it actually existed 
in United States Courts informed his thinking about legal education 
and the essential role of law schools in preparing would-be lawyers. 
This is best seen in an address that he twice delivered, in slightly 
different form, first upon his departure from Iowa and then on his 
assumption of the dean’s post at Washington University. 39  
Hammond began his address by asking what accounted for the 
growth of law schools in the previous two decades. He identified two 
factors: the adoption of code pleading and the coming of the 
railroads. Code pleading, which displaced the arcane system of writs 
that had grown up without systematic thought over the centuries, was 
originally intended by the reformers as a simplification and 
rationalization of legal procedure. In fact, in Hammond’s view, it had 
created the need for lawyers to think rather than to simply copy out 
the prescribed form. He observed:  
The code has made it impossible to practice law, or even to 
draw a single pleading, without an activity of thought that 
might formerly have been dispensed with, in all but really 
difficult cases. It has destroyed the uniformity of practice 
which enabled a beginner to employ form-books and 
precedents safely, without a real comprehension of their 
meaning. It has rendered useless, or worse than useless, that 
great stock of things learned by rote, in acquiring which the 
period of pupilage used to be mostly spent.40  
The change required that the lawyer “know the reason of everything 
he is to do, the principles which underlie all parts of his 
employment.”41 Rote learning of the law office was utterly 
inadequate to the purpose, and mechanical recitation of memorized 
passages from texts was scarcely better. 
This inadequacy of traditional legal training was compounded by 
 
 38. Id. at 6-7. 
 39. Although he presumably was unaware of it at the time, he was at precisely the halfway 
point of his academic career, having served for thirteen years at Iowa and embarking on what 
would be a thirteen year tenure at Washington. 
 40. Hammond, supra note 35, at 4. 
 41. Id. 
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the development of the railway system, for now the country was on 
the move as it had never been before. The railroad “changed the 
entire character of emigration and the formation of new states.”42 As 
a result, said Hammond, “our young lawyers have been drawn by the 
offer of such prizes for success, as were not dreamed of in the days of 
our fathers. To win these prizes, they needed an entirely different 
education from that which trained them to follow in the footsteps of 
their instructors.”43 Traditional training did not prepare the lawyer to 
take advantage of these opportunities: 
[I]f, for example, as has often happened, he reads law in a New 
England city or village, to practice it upon the western prairies, 
or the shores of the Pacific, he will almost certainly find that 
his treasured practical knowledge is a burden upon his back, 
and that the only thing of value he has saved from those 
laborious years, is the scanty stock of legal principles which 
have taken root in his mind, in spite of his efforts to fill that 
mind with mere forms.44  
Hammond had, in modern terminology, “thought outside the 
box”; like Langdell at Harvard, he had shifted the paradigm of legal 
education to create a system that conformed to the needs of a rapidly 
changing society. His influence on legal education, although perhaps 
not as extensive as Langdell’s, extended far beyond the law schools 
with which he was associated. During his tenure as dean at 
Washington University, he was instrumental in the creation and was a 
founding member of the American Bar Association’s Committee on 
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar. During his chairmanship 
of that Committee, the parent body adopted the Committee’s 
influential report and recommendations for accreditation and 
standards for admission to the bar.  
Significantly, while Hammond was dean at Washington 
University, the school admitted and graduated its first African-
American law student, Walter Moran Farmer. Although Missouri had 
remained in the Union during the Civil War, prejudice against 
 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
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African-Americans still prevailed in St. Louis and at the University. 
Farmer endured many manifestations of that prejudice as a law 
student. As a final insult, the members of his class refused to walk 
with him in the graduation procession. Dean Hammond walked with 
him. 
William Gardiner Hammond clearly merited the high regard in 
which he was held by his contemporaries and deserves more homage 
than he receives today. His academic career spanned the three 
decades following the Civil War when the nation was undergoing 
profound changes, changes that transformed the legal profession. He 
responded by initiating fundamental changes in the education of 
lawyers in order to equip students of his generation to cope with the 
challenges they would confront. 
Today, we are in a comparable situation. Hammond’s society was 
transformed by the railroad, ours by the Internet. Hammond’s 
generation saw the practice of law move from the provincial to 
encompass the national; ours from the national to the global. Under 
Hammond’s leadership, this law school responded to the stimuli of 
change by adapting its curriculum and mode of teaching to the needs 
of its time. At the initiative of our current dean, this law school has 
adopted a new strategic plan, again committing itself to change in 
ways that respond to the new needs of a global society. Under 
Hammond’s leadership, the law school thrived, increasing in quality 
and stature, and that should strengthen our confidence that we can do 
so now. 
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